Dynamic statutory interpretation /
William N. Eskridge, Jr.
- Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1994.
- ix, 438 p. ; 25 cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Introduction: Why Statutory Interpretation Is Worth a Book I. The Practice of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation. 1. The Insufficiency of Statutory Archaeology. 2. The Dynamics of Statutory Interpretation. 3. A Case Study: Labor Injunction Decisions, 1877-1938 II. Jurisprudential Theories for Reading Statutes Dynamically. 4. Liberal Theories. 5. Legal Process Theories. 6. Normativist Theories III. Doctrinal Implications of Dynamic Statutory Jurisprudence. 7. Legislative History Values. 8. Vertical versus Horizontal Coherence. 9. Canons of Statutory Construction as Interpretive Regimes Appendix 1 The Primary Legislative Inaction Precedents, 1962-1992 Appendix 2 Supreme Court Decisions Overruling Statutory Precedents, 1962-1992 Appendix 3 The Rehnquist Court's Canons of Statutory Construction
Contrary to traditional theories of statutory interpretation, which ground statutes in the original legislative text or intent, legal scholar William Eskridge argues that statutory interpretation changes in response to new political alignments, new interpreters, and new ideologies. It does so, first of all, because it involves richer authoritative texts than does either common law or constitutional interpretation: statutes are often complex and have a detailed legislative history. Second, Congress can, and often does, rewrite statutes when it disagrees with their interpretations; and agencies and courts attend to current as well as historical congressional preferences when they interpret statutes. Third, since statutory interpretation is as much agency-centered as judge-centered and since agency executives see their creativity as more legitimate than judges see theirs, statutory interpretation in the modern regulatory state is particularly dynamic
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Law--United States Law Court interpreting and translating